Only one-fourth of U.S. families own stock. This paper examines whether the consumption of stockholders differs from the consumption of nonstockholders and. if so. whether these differences help explain the empirical failures of the consumption-based CAPivl. Household panel data are used to construct time series on the consumption of each group. The results indicate that the consumption of stockholders is more volatile and more highly correlated with the excess return on the stock market. These differences help explain the size of the equity premium, although they do not fully resolve the equity premium puzzle.
Introduction
Over the past two decades much research has attempted to build and examine models linking the consumption decision and the portfolio allocation decision.
Contributions by Merton (1973) , Lucas (1978) , Breeden (1979 Breeden ( ,1986 , and Grossman and Shiller (1982) provided the theoretical underpinning of the consumption-based capital asset pricing model. Many empirical studies testing this model quickly followed. Unfortunately, the 'Mankiw is grateful for financial support from the National Science Foundation. Zeldes is grateful for financial support from the John M. Olin Fellowship at the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Wharton Junior Faculty Research Fund. and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.
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weight of the avai!able evidence is that the standard model appears not to describe adequately the data on consumption and stock returns. One of the most prominent empirical failures of the modei is the equity premium puzzle. Over the past hundred years, the return on equity has averaged about 6'3 more than the return on short-term Treasury bills. btehra and Prescott (1985) show that this equity premium is too large to be explained by a standard general equilibrium asset pricing model. More generally. the puzzle can be seen by examining the first-order conditions that arise in almost any asset pricin g model that relates consumption and asset returns. A number of explanations of the equity premium puzzle have been proposed. but none has fully resolved the puzzle. ' The source of the puzzle is that aggregate consumption growth covaries too little with the return on equities to justify the large obsened risk premium on stocks. As a result, implausibly high levels of risk aversion are required to rationalize the size of the equity premium.
Intuitively. if the random movements in stock returns are not associated with large changes in consumption, the randomness does not represent true riskiness to the consumer and therefore should not require a large risk premium.
An objection to the empirical work on consumption-based asset pricing models, including work on the equity premium, is that it relies on consumption data aggregated across stockholding and nonstockholding families. Estimates we present below indicate that about three-fourths of U.S. families hold no stock. These nonstockholding consumers are unlikely to satisfy the first-order conditions for the optimal holdin, 0 of assets that underlie the consumption CAPM. Unless the consumption of stockholders fortuitously moves together with the consumption of nonstockholders. the standard practice of testing the model with data on aggregate consumption is inappropriate.
This paper is the first attempt to examine empirically the hypothesis that the consumption of stockholders differs from the consumption of nonstockholders. We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to construct a time series of the consumption of stockholders and a time series of the consumption of nonstockholders. The data have some serious limitations: substantial measurement error, a relatively short time series, and the availability of only food consumption.
Despite these shortcomings, the evidence indicates that stockholders and nonstockholders differ substantially. In particular, stockholders' consumption is more volatile and more highly corre-lated with the stock market. Although our data cannot provide a complete resolution of the equity premium puzzle, our findings suggest that the distinction between stockholders and nonstockholders may be crucial to an ultimate resolution of this puzzle and other asset pricing anomalies. Addressing this issue more fully will require better data on the consumption of stockholders.
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin in section 2 by summarizing some evidence on the frequency of stockholding and the demographic characteristics of stockholders and nonstockholders.
We then review in section 3 the consumption-based capital asset pricing model. Focusing on the Euler equation relating consumption growth and asset returns, we discuss why the equity premium of 6% is puzzling. We argue that failures of the consumption CAPM might be rationalized by a model with two groups of consumers: stockholders and nonstockholders.
In section 4 we examine the volatility of consumption and the correlation of consumption growth with stock returns for stockholders and nonstockholders.
In section 5 we present conclusions and suggestions for further research.
Who holds stock?
We use data on a representative sample of families from the Of the total sample of 2,998 families, 27.6% hold a positive amount of their wealth in stocks, and 72.4% own no stock. The families that do not hold stock earn 62% of disposable income, account for 68% of food expenditure, and own 34% of total liquid assets (including stocks). Some stockholders own small amounts of stock. Only 23.2% of the sample holds equity in excess of Sl,OOO, and only 11.9% holds equity in excess of $10,000.
The results in who have substantial liquid assets also hold no stock. Of those consumers holding other liquid assets in excess of S100.000, only 47.7% hold equity. For these wealthy consumers, the failure to hold equity is more puzzling. Substantial information costs or noneconomic reasons may be the explanation. We can learn more about the reasons for not holding stock by examining the relationship between stockholding status and family characteristics. Table  2 shows the probability of bein, 0 a stockholder for different categories of education and labor earnings averaged over three years.' We find that the fraction of households owning stock increases with average labor income, even holding education constant. For example, among households whose head has a high school degree but no college degree, 14.1% of those in the lowest income quartile own stock, whereas 47.8% of those in the highest income quartile own stock. In addition, more highly educated household heads are more likely to be stockholders, even holding income constant. For example, among households in the third income quartile, 17.5% of those with no high school degree own stock, whereas 512% of those with a college degree own stock. (The only exception to the latter finding is that having an advanced degree lowers the likelihood of stock ownership.) These findings are not surprising and are consistent with the presence of fixed information 'For earlier work on the demographics of stockholders, see Crockett and Friend (1963) . Blume, . and Blume and Friend (1978) . (1-C) (2233) costs. Higher-income families are more likely to choose to pay the hved cost because they have larger portfolios, and the tixed cost is lower for the more educated because information acquisition and processing are less costly. We conclude this section by noting two potential problems with these data on stock ownership. The first is that some consumers may hold stock through pension funds and yet be called nonstockholders by the PSID. The existence of pension plans, however, does not substantially increase the prevalence of stock ownership.
In 1978, 51% of the labor force had no pension plan at all. Moreover, 69% of those in pension plans had defined-benefit rather than defined-contribution plans. Thus, only 16% of the labor force had definedcontribution pension plans.3 Since the residual claimants in defined-benefit plans are the shareholders of the firms rather than the pension recipients, these pension recipients should not be viewed as stockholders.
Therefore, the data in tables 1 and 2 do not substantially understate the incidence of stock ownership.
sThese figures are reported in Belier (1983) . The percentage of the labor force with definedcontribution plans has been trending upward and reached 31 % in 1987 (Belier, private conversation). Thus, indirect stock ownership may be more important today than it has been historically. Note that these figures refer to individuals rather than families. It is likely that some of the defined-contribution plan members also hold stock outside of their pension plans and would thus already be counted by us as stockholders.
In addition, some individuals in the PSID may have included stocks held in defined-contribution pension plans in the reported market value of stocks. 
where C is consumption, U(C) is the instantaneous utility function, and 6 is the subjective rate of time preference.
Between any two points in time, the first-order condition for this problem is
where R:,,,, is the rate of return on asset i between t and t + s. For simplicity, it is often assumed that the utility function takes the isoelastic form where A is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion. One can use this first-order condition to derive the following relation between consumption and asset returns:
where CC, is the instantaneous rate of growtn of consumption Perhaps the most prominent anomaly for the consumption CAPM is the equity premium puzzle. To see what the model implies for the equity premium, consider the case in which asset i is the market portfolio of stocks and asset j is the short-term government bond rate. Eq. (4) then becomes the equation for the equity risk premium. Letting R," and Rf denote the return on the market portfolio and the risk-free rate, eq. (4) can be rewritten as
E( R," -Rf) =A corr( RF -R:,GC,).~(GC,).U(R~-R~). (5)
One can use aggregate data to estimate the sample moments in eq. (5) and infer the coefficient of relative risk aversion A.' Table 3 presents estimates of A from different estimates of the sample moments. The first row uses the Mehra and Prescott (1985) data, which are annual from 1890 to 1979. In these data, the correlation of the excess return on the Standard and Poors 500 and the growth of consumption is 0.40, the standard deviation of the growth of nondurables and services consumption is 0.036, the standard deviation of the excess return on the market is 0.167, and the average excess return is 0.062. These figures, together with eq. (5), imply that the coefficient of relative risk aversion is 26.3. These numbers are based 'This approach of calibrating the first-order condition is followed, for example, by Grossman, Melino. and Shiller (1987) and Mankiw (1986). It differs from the Mehra-Prescott approach of calibrating a general equilibrium model. The second row uses only postwar data; although the correlation of consumption growth and the excess return is higher. consumption growth is less volatile. raising the implied value of A to 89. [Romer (1989) has provided evidence that prewar National Income Accounts output data are excessively volatile. suggesting that greater weight should be placed on the postwar calculations than on those based on the longer time series.] The third row uses consumption of food only, to provide National Income Accounts results that are most comparable to those based on the PSID data. Overall, the results are similar to those based on nondurables and services: the implied value of .4 is 66.5. The last row presents calculations based on aggregate food consumption for all families in the PSID sample. The correlation between consumption growth and the excess return is slightly lower, implying a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 100.1.
Most economists view the equity premium as puzzling because such large coefficients of relative risk aversion seem implausib1e.j To judge the reasonableness of this parameter estimate, it is instructive to consider simple choices under uncertainty. For example, consider what value of X would make an individual indifferent between the following two gambles over consumption:
Gamble 1 $50,000 with probability 0.5 $100,000 with probability 0.5 Gamble 2 $X with probability 1 .O Assuming constant relative risk aversion utility, here is the translation between the choice of X and the risk aversion parameter A. Values of X as low as 51,858 seem implausible, suggesting that the level of risk aversion necessary to generate the observed equity premium is too large to be believable. This application of the consumption CAPM, like most of the empirical literature on this topic, assumes that aggregate consumption is the relevant measure with which to test the model. Yet many consumers hold no stock at all. To see the implications of nonstockholding for the consumption CAPM, consider an economy with two groups of individuals. One group is involved in the stock market and is at an interior solution with respect to the holding of stocks, and the other group holds no stocks at all. The relationship between aggregate consumption and the stock market considered above is no longer valid, because aggregate consumption includes the consumption of both the individuals who satisfy the first-order conditions and those who do not. Eq. (5) does hold for the total consumption of the stockholders, however, because the Grossman-Shiller aggregation theorem applies to this subset of consumers. 'Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Weil (1989) point out that an additional part of the puzzle relates to the low historical mean level of the riskless rate of return. This riskless rate puzzle can be viewed as the inability to fit eq. (3) to the aggregate data using the rate on short-term Treasuw bills.
To implement empirically this model with two groups of consumers, one needs separate measures of the consumption of stockholders and nonstockholders. Unfortunately, aggregate data of this sort are not directly available. Below we use panel data on households from the PSID to construct the consumption of stockholders and contrast it with the consumption of nonstockholders.
Consumption comparisons
To examine the differences between stockholder and nonstockholder consumption, we begin with 17 years of data from the PSID. The consumption questions in the survey ask about the amount spent on food consumed at home and food consumed in restaurants (but not about total consumption expenditures).
We deflate each component by its corresponding consumer price index and sum the two components to compute total real food consumption.
These data show that stockholding families spend approximately 25% more per capita on food than nonstockholding families (approximately 12% more on food consumed at home and almost 80% more on food away from home), and that approximately 75% of stockholders' food expenditures and 17% of nonstockholders' food expenditures occur away from home. The survey is administered sometime between late February and April, and the questions ask about consumption around the time of the survey. We interpret the responses as equal to consumption during the first quarter of the year, and time our stock returns and deflators accordingly. Certain consumption questions were not asked in the first and sixth surveys. As a result, growth rates could not be computed for the second, fifth, and sixth years. We are left with thirteen annual observations of growth rates between 1970 and 1984.
Because the question about the value of stocks was asked only in 1984, we categorize consumers as stockholders and nonstockholders throughout the sample on the basis of their 1984 stockholdings.
We split the sample into stockholders and nonstockholders in three ways. In split 1, a household is a stockholder if it holds any stock at all. In split 2, a household is a stockholder if it holds at least $1,000 of stock. In split 3, a household is a stockholder if it holds at least $10,000 of stock. In each case, the families that do not satisfy the criterion are considered nonstockholders. We sum family consumption across stockholders, nonstockholders, and all families, and then divide by the total number of family members in each group, to obtain aggregate per-capita measures of stockholder, nonstockholder, and total consumption. The growth rates of these consumption measures are presented in the appendix. For a detailed description of the data construction, see Mankiw and Zeldes (1990) and Zeldes (1989) . The values aggregated across all consumers in the PSID correspond reasonably well to the numbers reported in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). For the 13 observations on growth rates, the correlation between the NIPA and PSID measures is 0.61 for total food consumption, 0.75 for food at home, and 0.51 for food away from home. The average real (1972 dollars) food consumption per capita in the PSlD was $1,323, whereas the corresponding value over the same period in the NIPA data was $1,692. Note that in the 1984 NIPA data, food consumption is 51% of nondurable consumption and 19% of total consumer spending. Table 4 presents some sample statistics on total food consumption aggregated for the entire sample and for subsamples of stockholders and nonstockholders. For each group, we present three statistics: the correlation between consumption growth and the excess return on equity, the standard deviation of consumption growth, and the covariance of consumption growth with the excess equity return. The excess equity return is the differential between the return on the S&P 500 and the return on 90-day Treasury bills.
Two findings in table 4 are noteworthy. First, the aggregate consumption of stockholders is more highly correlated with the stock market than is the aggregate consumption of nonstockholders. Second, the consumption of stockholders is more volatile than the consumption of nonstockholders. Both findings imply that the covariance of consumption growth with the excess return -the crucial moment for evaluating the equity premium -is much greater for stockholders.
For split 1, this covariance is five times as great for Table 5 Test for equality of covariances CC is the growth of consumption (based on the PSID) and rm -rr is the difference between the return on the S&P 500 and the return on three-month Treasury bills. In split I, a household is a stockholder if it holds any stock at all. In split 2, a household is a stockholder if it holds at least $1,000 of stock. In split 3, a household is a stockholder if it holds at least 510.0Oil of stock. In each case, the families that do not satisfy the criterion are considered nonstockholders. For split 3, the estimate of p is 0.08. This implies that when the excess return on equity is 20% (which is about one standard deviation from the mean), the consumption of stockholders rises 1.6% relative to the consumption of nonstockholders.
The difference between stockholders and nonstockholders is thus large economically as well as statistically. Table 6 uses the moments estimated from the PSID to examine whether the distinction between stockholders and nonstockholders can resolve the equity premium puzzle.
Recall from table 3 that using the entire sample for the PSID implies a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 100. Performing the same calculation using the consumption only of stockholders gives an estimate of A of 35. Although 35 is implausibly high, looking at the consumption of stockholders moves us substantially toward resolving the equity premium
puzzle.
An important question is whether the distinction between stockholders and nonstockholders can explain the equity premium for a longer period. Al- ' The results in tables 1 and 5 are based on the growth rate of the average consumption for each group. An alternative approach would be to examine the average of the growth rates of consumption; this is equivalent to using a geometric rather than an arithmetic mean of consumption.
This alternative approach yields results that are qualitatively similar but statistically much less significant.
The difference in the approaches is that the growth rate of the arithmetic mean gives greater weight to the growth rate of high-consumption families. The results presented in the text are most analogous to the standard approach in the literature based on aggregate data. though a centur); of panel data is not yet available. we can try to answer this question using the evidence in tables 3 and 6. In our short PSID sample, the covariance determining the equity premium is three times as large for stockholder consumption as for aggregate consumption. If this is also true for the 1890 to 1979 sample, a coefficient of relative risk aversion of only 6 would explain the size of the equity premium over that period.
Although these calculations suggest that the distinction between stockholders and nonstockholders can potentially resolve the equity premium puzzle, a final judgment requires better data. First, it would be preferable to have data on a consumption measure broader than food consumption. Looking back at the NIPA data in table 3, however, we find that the covariance of the excess equity return with consumption growth is roughly the same using food consumption as it is using nondurables and services consumption. Thus, we suspect that the use of food consumption does not substantially alter the estimated covariance.
Second, and more important, our ability to separate stockholders and nonstockholders is imperfect. Because the PSID first asked about stockholding only in 1984, we undoubtedly include many nonstockholders in our stockholder category in the early years of our sample. We suspect that a more accurate separation of consumers would yield an even greater covariance of stockholder consumption with equity returns.
Conclusions
Only about a quarter of U.S. families own stock. In this paper, we examine the differences between the consumption patterns of stockholders and nonstockholders.
Our analysis suffers from the fact that our data measure only food consumption, cover only a relatively short period, and contain substantial measurement error. Nevertheless. our examination suggests that the distinction between stockholders and nonstockholders is important for explaining the empirical failure of the consumption-based capital asset pricing model. We find that the aggregate consumptions of these two groups differ substantially.
Furthermore, since we find that stockholder consumption covaries more strongly with excess equity returns than does total consumption, the differences between these two groups help explain the equity premium. The implied coefficient of relative risk aversion based on stockholder consumption is only about one-third of that based on the consumption of all families. Although the resulting coefficient is still too large to be plausible, our work goes in the direction of resolving the equity premium puzzle.
A number of questions remain unanswered. First, why do many wealthy households hold no stock at all? Second, is there a way to approximate the consumption of stockholders using data that are available as a long time series? We leave these questions open for future research. 
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